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entitled "Marijuana and the Law in Mary-
land." It featured interviews with Judge 
Carl Bacharach, a state district court 
judge in Baltimore, and Joseph Gallen, 
Baltimore County's chief of police, as well 
as a "point-counterproint" segment 
which pitted state Senator Clarence 
Mitchell, an advocate of marijuana 
decriminalization, against state Delegate 
Steven Sklar, a foe of decriminalization. 
Also recelvmg an award was The 
Forum, a university-funded and student-
edited magazine which publishes articles 
of interest to the Maryland legal com-
munity. The magazine, in competition 
with law school publications nationwide, 
won an "Honorable Mention" for its arti-
cles on substantive law. 
University of Baltimore 
School of Law 
Honor Court Decision 
HONOR COURT DECISIONS 
No. 76-1E, September 2, 1976 
No. 76-2E, September 22, 1976 
FENZEL, J.-Two cases were argued 
before Justices Murphy, Fenzel and Smith 
of the Evening Division Honor Court. 
Since the combined actions of the defen-
dants resulted in similar charges being 
placed, alleging misconduct under the 
same section of the Honor Code, the 
Court decided to consolidate its opinion 
to cover both trials. 
Students A and B were both charged 
with violating sec. 3.03 of the Honor 
Code (Code) which states that "it shall be 
a violation of the honor code to engage in 
any dishonorable conduct which tends to 
gain an unfair advantage for any student 
in any academic matter." 
The court unanimously found A guilt of 
violating sec. 3.03 of the Code. Sentence 
was imposed under S.OUe) of the Code 
which was a reprimand not of record. B, 
however, was found not guilty of any 
violation. 
FACTS 
The Open Exam system which is pre-
sently in effect at the University of 
Baltimore is designed so that a student 
may take any exam for which he or she is 
scheduled at any of the pre-arranged 
times during a two-week period. In ob-
taining an exam, the student presents his 
or her student J.D. and tells the person 
distributing the exams the one he or she 
wishes to take at that time. In the situa-
tion presently before the Court, the defen-
dant A inadvertantly received two copies 
of a Commercial Transactions I exam 
when he appeared to take the final. After 
completing the exam, A returned only one 
copy and kept the other. A retained the 
exam, for the admitted purpose of filing 
with the Student Bar Association, even 
though he knew at the time of appropriat-
ing the exam the Professor did not allow 
his prior exams to be made available to 
students as study aids. 
Defendant A had no apparent need for 
the exam but admitted that it may be 
beneficial to other students in the future 
who would be preparing for this Profes-
sor's final exam in Commercial Transac-
tions I. 
As misfortune may have it, a number of 
students for that semester received a 
"provisional" failure (F) in this course. 
The "F" grade was subject to change if 
the unsuccessful student took another 
exam anytime during the summer, at a 
time convenient to the Professor, and suc-
ceeded in passing the course. 
A received a passing grade on the initial 
exam and consequently did not take the 
re-examination. However, defendant B in 
receiving a "provisional" failure, of which 
he had casually informed A, had decided 
to take the re-examination during the 
summer. Shortly after the end of the 
Spring Semester and upon learning that B 
was taking the re-examination, A in-
formed B that he had a copy of the most 
recent Commercial Transactions I exam, 
and he would mail it to B to use as a study 
gUide. B received the exam in the mail, 
and later returned it to A upon A's re-
quest. A contacted B prior to B's taking 
the exam upon learning that his acts con-
stituted a possible Honor Code violation. 
A testified before this Court that a fellow 
student had informed A that she felt 
obligated under the Code to contact a 
member of the Student Bar Association as 
the whereabouts of the exam and A's pur-
ported acts. The exam eventually was sent 
to the Special Prosecutor's Office and the 
resulting charges were placed. 
The indictment filed by the Special 
Prosecutor simply charged both A and B 
with the respective acts of distributing 
and receiving the Commercial Transac-
tions I exam which constituted dishonora-
ble conduct tending to give B an unfair 
advantage. A and B were specifically 
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charged with violating section sec. 3.03 of 
the Evening Division Honor Code. 
ISSUES 
The main issue to be decided is whether 
the conduct of the defendants did in fact 
give an unfair advantage to any student. 
The prosecution's main contentions 
were that the acts of A constituted dis-
honorable conduct because: (1) A, know-
ing that the Professor of the particular 
Commercial Transactions I Course did not 
allow for the dissemination of previous 
exams to any students, voluntarily gave 
the exam to B, (2) A knew that B was to 
take a re-examination of Commercial 
Transactions I-covering the exact same 
subject matter as the copy which he had 
retained, and (3) B was to be the only stu-
dent, to A's knowledge, who would be 
able to use the prior exam in preparing for 
the re-examination. 
In a transcribed deposition admitted 
into evidence by the Court without objec-
tion to any answer by defendant A, the 
prosecution showed by A's admissions, 
and corroborated by the prosecution's 
witness, that A did realize that his actions 
would benefit B only and that the Profes-
sor did not allow the use of prior exams as 
study aids. Since the prosecution had met 
its burden of proof (Le. beyond a reasona-
ble doubt) a motion for acquittal by the 
defendant A was denied. 
The defendant A, per se, contended 
that the conduct in question was not dis-
honorable because he had no specific in-
tent to allow another student to gain an 
unfair advantage and that no unfair ad-
vantage was gained by.B since the re-ex-
amination did not ask the same specific 
questions as the exam mailed to B. 
The Court concludes, at the close of the 
defendant's case and upon hearing final 
arguments by both sides, that the speCific 
act of A, giving B the copy of the Com-
mercial Transactions I exam, constituted 
dishonorable conduct. Intent is not an ele-
ment of this section of the Code. The sec-
tion was designed to encompass a great 
diversity as to the kinds of activities 
regulated by the Code. If intent were a re-
q'lisite element, then obViously this sec-
tion would be restrictive rather than broad 
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as the drafters of the Code obViously in-
tended.l 
The fact that B was to be the only stu-
dent who could avail himself to this prior 
exam, also considering the absolute policy 
of the Professor as to the censorhsip of his 
previous exams for study aids, and, as ad-
duced from questioning the Professor 
before this Court, the fact that historically 
he had used questions or factual situations 
on previous exams more than once, we 
conclude that A did violate sec. 3.03 of 
the Honor Code. 
Considering the nature of the offense, 
evidence of good character of the student 
and the ultimate advantage which 
resulted, the student was reprimanded 
and the contents of the Court file were not 
to be made a part of A's permanent 
record. 
The Dean of the Law School was to 
receive a letter as to the findings of the 
Honor Court. 
The prosecution in arguing the case of 
B likewise contended, inter alia, that the 
receipt of the examination from A was 
dishonorable conduct. Even though B 
testified on his own behalf that he was not 
aware of the Professor's policy as to the 
1 Comments to sec. 3.03 states that "the section was 
written in recognition that all the conceivable ways 
in which one student can gain unfair advantage over 
another cannot be enumerated with detailed 
specificity. Therefore, the section is a grant of power 
to the Honor Court to made an hoc determinations 
as to the unfairness of any given student's conduct." 
availability of his previous exams, the 
standard which should be used to gauge 
the actions of defendants under sec. 3.03, 
according to the prosecution, is to be an 
objective reasonable man standard. 
Therefore, the prosecution claims that B 
should have known of the Professor's 
policy, and notwithstanding his ignorance 
of the policy, the conduct was dishonor-
able. 
The defendant B, with effective assist-
ance of counsel, moved for acquittal 
before the introduction of any evidence 
on the grounds that sec. 4.02(b)(I), which 
required written notice to the defendant 
prior to the preliminary hearing of the 
specific charges and course of conduct of 
which the defendant is accused, had not 
been strictly followed. The Prosecutor ad-
mitted failure to comply with this section. 
In denying the motion the Court felt 
that the failure to comply with sec. 
4.02(b)(I) was not prejudicial to the de-
fendant and is not crucial to the disposi-
tion of this case. The Court in denying the 
motion on these grounds did not consider 
the timeliness of the defendant's objec-
tion. 
The defendant B admitted that he did 
receive the exam, but that receipt of such 
did not constitute dishonorable conduct 
since he did not have knowledge of the 
Professor's policy. The defendant also 
argued that the prosecution did not meet 
its burden of proof requirement, Le. 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, 
NOTICE: 
Law Placement 
Do you need a part-time law clerk, a summer law 
clerk or a full-time law graduate? Or, do you have 
a law related position that you would like to have 
competently filled? 
Contact Assistant Dean William I. Weston 
at the Law Placement Service at the University of Baltimore 
001 of. Law, 1420 North Charles Street, Baltimore, Md. 21202. 
by returning the exam which he received 
. from A well before taking the re-examina-
tion, B attempted to show good faith and 
lack of intent to gain an unfair advantage. 
Without deciding all the issues pre-
sented to the Court by the prosecution 
Lawyer 
Advertising 
Given 
Go-Ahead 
by Glenn A. Jacobson 
Be it bane or godsend to the legal pro-
fession, the Supreme Court has given the 
green light to the formerly blasphemous 
practice of lawyers advertising their serv-
ices. Self-regulation by member-run pro-
fessional organizations was the traditional 
means of guaranteeing the public that 
they would receive good value for their 
money and quality work when they re-
tained a lawyer. But, the exclusive 
watchdog function of these organizations 
has now been eroded by the wave of con-
sumerism. The most recent example of 
and defense, the Court holds that the 
prosecution did not successfully meet its 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that B's conduct was dishonorable. 
Any presumption of dishonorable conduct 
was erased by B's unassailed testimony 
that he did not know of the Professor's 
restrictive policy as to availability of pre-
vious exams at the time of receiving the 
copy from A. 
In conclusion, B was found not guilty of 
violating sec. 3.03 of the Code. 
Supreme· Court 
Decisions 
this trend is the case of Bates v. State Bar 
of Arizona, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977). 
In 1974, John R. Bates and Van 
a'Steen, having been members of the 
Arizona Bar for two years, opened a law 
practice in Phoenix, Arizona which they 
referred to as a "legal clinic." A major 
goal of this practice was "to provide legal 
services at modest fees to persons of 
moderate income who did not qualify for 
governmental legal aid." 97 S.Ct. at 
2694. 
The clinic accepted only routine mat-
ters such as uncontested separations and 
divorces, personal bankruptcies, name 
changes, and uncontested adoptions, 
making extensive use of paralegal assist-
ants and standardized forms to facilitate a 
quick flow of business. 
Two years later, "appellants concluded 
that their practice and clinical concept 
could not survive unless the availability of 
legal services at low cost was advertised 
and, in particular, fees were advertised." 
97 S.Ct. at 2694. an February 22, 1976, 
Bates and a'Steen placed their advertise-
ment in the Arizona Republic, a Phoenix 
daily newspaper, offering "legal services 
at very reasonable fees" and listing partic-
ular services and corresponding fees. 
In response, the President of the 
Arizona State Bar initiated proceedings 
against Bates and a'Steen, alleging that 
their advertisement was in violation of 
Rule 29(a) of the Supreme Court of 
Arizona, 17 Arizona Stat. (1976 Supp.), 
p. 26. The disciplinary rule provides in 
part: 
"(B) A lawyer shall not publicize him-
self, or his partner, or associate, or any 
other lawyer through newspaper .,. 
advertisements .... " 
A three member Special Local Admin-
istrative Committee held a hearing, pur-
suant to Arizona Supreme Court Rule 33, 
but declined to consider an attack on the 
valildity of the rule. However, the com-
mittee did recommend that both Bates 
and a'Steen be suspended from the prac-
tice of law for at least six months. Shortly 
thereafter, the Board of Governors of the 
Arizona State Bar, pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 36, reviewed the case and 
recommended one week suspensions to 
each appellant. 
Bates and a'Steen sought review of the 
case in the Arizona Supreme Court alleg-
ing that the disciplinary rule they had ig-
nored was both violative of the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act and an infringement of 
their First Amendment rights. The 
Arizona Supreme Court rejected both 
claims, and the Supreme Court of the 
United States consented to hear the case. 
429 U.S. 813 (1976). 
The Supreme Court's decision in the 
Bates case focused on an analysis of the 
allegation that First Amendment Rights 
were being interfered with by the con-
tinued enforcement of Arizona Supreme 
Court Rule 20. This analysis is an exten-
sion of previous Supreme Court decisions 
acknowledging First Amendment protec-
tion for commercial speech. Bigelow v. 
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748 (1976). 
In Bigelow, the managing editor of a 
Virginia newspaper was found guilty of 
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